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Abstract 
We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (or spatial price 
discrimination model) with a linear city. First, we extend a delivered pricing duopoly with Bertrand competition of 
Hamilton et al. (1989) to an n-firm model and explicitly solve the equilibrium location pattern. Next, we investigate 
welfare implication of the equilibrium location pattern. Given the Bertrand competition in the second stage we consider 
the welfare effect of relocations from the equilibrium locations. The equilibrium distance between firms is smaller than 
in the first best case, while it is too large from the second best viewpoint.
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     1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Hotelling (1929), a rich literature on spatial competition has
emerged. The Hotelling model has become one of the most important methods of analyz-
ing product diﬀerentiation. The major advantage of this approach is to endogenize product
selection. Location models fall into two categories: shipping or delivered pricing (shopping or
mill pricing) models are those in which ﬁrms (consumers) bear the transport costs. Although
delivered pricing competition is widely observed, the literature on delivered pricing spatial
competition has appeared relatively recently. Lederer and Hurter (1986) carry out a pioneer-
ing work on delivered pricing with Bertrand competition. Hamilton et al. (1989) solve the
equilibrium location pattern of a Hotelling-type linear-city duopoly model with both Bertrand
and Cournot competition.1
We generalize the Bertrand model of Hamilton et al. (1989) to an n-ﬁrm oligopoly.2
Furthermore, we analyze welfare implications of the equilibrium location. We consider two
types of problems. In one case the social planner controls both locations and prices of the
ﬁrms (ﬁrst best problem). In the other case the social planner controls only locations (second
best problem). We ﬁnd that in equilibrium the distance between the ﬁrms is too small from
the ﬁrst best viewpoint, while it is too large from the second best viewpoint.
2. Model
There is a linear city of length 1 where inﬁnitely many consumers lie uniformly. There are n
ﬁrms in the market and they engage in the following location-price competition. In the ﬁrst
stage, each ﬁrm simultaneously and independently decides where on the line to locate. Let
xi ∈ [0,1] be ﬁrm i’s location, for i ∈{ 1,...,n}. After observing the rivals’ locations, in the
second stage each ﬁrm simultaneously and independently chooses its price level at every point
(market) in the continuum [0,1] so as to maximize its proﬁt. Without loss of generality, let
xi ≤ xj for all i<j . For brevity, let the vector x signify the ﬁrm locations (x1,...,xn).
Assume that the demand function at each market is linear, i.e., Q(x)=A − p(x), where
A is a positive constant, and p(x) and Q(x) are the price and the total quantity supplied at
market x, respectively. Each ﬁrm incurs a symmetric constant marginal cost of production,
which we normalize to zero without loss of generality. The ﬁrms must pay transport costs.
To ship a unit of the product from its plant xi to a market at point x, ﬁrm i must pay a
transport cost t|x − xi|, where t is a positive constant and |x − xi| is the distance between x
1Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) and Norman (1981) examine Cournot competition in spatial models, but
they discuss the equilibrium price pattern rather than the equilibrium location pattern.
2The equilibrium location pattern of the n-ﬁrm Cournot counterpart and its welfare implications are dis-
cussed by Anderson and Neven (1991) and Matsumura and Shimizu (2005), respectively. For the circular city
version, see, Gupta et al. (2004), Matsumura et al. (2005), Matsushima (2001), Pal (1998), and Shimizu and
Matsumura (2003).
1and xi. The consumers are assumed to have a prohibitively costly transport cost, preventing
arbitrage. Finally, we assume that A ≥ 2t. This ensures that eﬀective competition exists at
every market and monopoly pricing does not occur regardless of ﬁrm locations.
Consider ﬁrm i, where i is in {2,...,n − 1}. At the market x where |x − xi−1|≥| x − xi|
and |x−xi|≤| x−xi+1|, only ﬁrm i supplies and the price p(x) becomes min{t|x−xi−1|,t|x−
xi+1|,p M
i (xi)}, where pM
i (xi) ≡ (A − t|x − xi|)/2 is the monopoly price by ﬁrm i. Under the
assumption A ≥ 2t, the price p(x) becomes min{t|x − xi−1|,t|x − xi+1|}. Thus, among the
locations that ﬁrm i serves, ﬁrm i supplies at the price t|x − xi−1| at the markets closer to
ﬁrm i − 1 than to ﬁrm i + 1, and ﬁrm i sets the price at t|x − xi+1| at other markets. Firms
1 and n have only one neighbor each. Thus, for x ∈ [0,(x1 + x2)/2] ﬁrm 1 sets its price at
t(x2−x), and for x ∈ [(xn−1 +xn)/2,1] ﬁrm n supplies at price t(x−xn−1). The proﬁt of ﬁrm
i at market x is given by
πi(x)=( t|x − xi+1|−t|x − xi|)(A − t|x − xi+1|)
if ∀j |x − xi|≤| x − xj|, and |x − xi+1|≤| x − xi−1|,
=( t|x − xi−1|−t|x − xi|)(A − t|x − xi−1|)
if ∀j |x − xi|≤| x − xj|, and |x − xi−1|≤| x − xi+1|,
= 0 otherwise. (1)






We solve for the equilibrium location pattern in this n ﬁrm game. From here on, let a = A/t.
Let the superscript ‘E’ denote equilibrium locations. For n = 2, Hamilton et al. (1989)
provide the solution. In the duopoly, there is a direct interaction between the location of ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 2. For n = 3, however, there is only an indirect interaction between the location
strategies taken by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 3. That is, any movement by ﬁrm 1 (keeping the restriction
x1 ≤ x2) has no eﬀect on the proﬁt level of ﬁrm 3. Similarly, for n ≥ 3, any movement by ﬁrm
i within xi ∈ [xi−1,x i+1] has no impact on incentives for ﬁrms other than ﬁrm i − 1 and ﬁrm
i+1. Taking this into account, the following proposition summarizes the equilibrium location
pattern when n ≥ 3.
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Firm i ∈{ 2,...,n − 1} locates at xE
i = xE
1 +( i − 1)(1 − 2xE
1 )/(n − 1).
Proof: First we look for several necessary conditions for equilibrium. Using (1) and (2), we





1  =0 ,x E
n  =1 . (iii) xE
1 =1− xE
n. Thus, the ﬁrms do not locate at the ends of the
linear market and the locations are symmetric. The inner n−2 ﬁrms equally divide the region
[xE
1 ,x E
n]i n t on − 1 parts. The length of the region is 1 − 2xE
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must hold. Using these two equations, solving for xE
1 and xE
2 and looking for answers in the
appropriate range yield the desired result. The locations for ﬁrms 3,...,n−1 are derived using
the above logic used to obtain (3). xE
n is obtained from condition (iii).
To show that this location outcome is indeed an equilibrium, we have to check for the
following possible deviations:
(a) An inner ﬁrm (ﬁrms 2, ···,n −1) moving within its current neighbors. For example, ﬁrm
2 moving from xE
2 to somewhere between xE
1 and xE
3 .
(b) An inner ﬁrm moving outside the range between its neighbors but not at the edges of the
linear city (between 0 and xE
1 and between xE
n and 1).
(c) An inner ﬁrm moving to near an edge of the linear city.
(d) An outer ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm n) moving while keeping its neighbor. For example, ﬁrm 1
moving from xE
1 to somewhere between 0 and xE
2 .
(e) An outer ﬁrm moving to the other end of the market. For example, ﬁrm 1 moving from
xE
1 to somewhere between xE
n and 1.
(f) An outer ﬁrm moving to become an inner ﬁrm.
We have shown that if the ﬁrms do not realign their relative locations (so that x1 ≤ x2 ≤
···≤xn holds), the location pattern given in Proposition 1 is the only possible equilibrium
location pattern. Thus we have already considered deviations (a) and (d). Deviation (d) is
more proﬁtable than deviation (e), as the potential neighbor is located further away from the
end of the market, giving more room for the deviating ﬁrm. Deviation (f) is proﬁtable only if
deviation (b) is proﬁtable, as we show in Proposition 2 that the outer ﬁrms make more proﬁt
than the inner ﬁrms. Deviation (b) is proﬁtable only if deviation (c) is proﬁtable, since the
latter allows for a higher price and more market served. Finally, we show that deviation (c)
is not proﬁtable for the inner ﬁrm. The proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 before and after deviation can be
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We proved that ΠE
2 ≥ ΠD
2 by the following three steps.
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The detailed derivations in the three steps are available from authors upon request. Q.E.D.
Table I summarizes the numerical results for xE
1 and xE
2 for selected values of a and n.
Table I: Equilibrium locations for ﬁrms 1 and 2












3 0.1781 0.5000 0.1737 0.5000 0.1707 0.5000 0.1686 0.5000 0.1669 0.5000
4 0.1319 0.3773 0.1294 0.3765 0.1275 0.3758 0.1262 0.3754 0.1251 0.3750
5 0.1046 0.3023 0.1029 0.3015 0.1008 0.3004 0.1002 0.3001 0.1001 0.3000
10 0.0512 0.1509 0.0508 0.1506 0.0505 0.1504 0.0502 0.1502 0.0500 0.1500
40 0.0126 0.0376 0.0126 0.0375 0.0125 0.0375 0.0125 0.0375 0.0125 0.0375
100 0.0050 0.0150 0.0050 0.0150 0.0050 0.0150 0.0050 0.0150 0.0050 0.0150
The analytical outcomes of the equilibrium proﬁt levels are diﬃcult to parse due to the
square root signs. However, we can show a result on the relative size of proﬁts for the ﬁrms.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, Πj > Πk, where j ∈{ 1,n} and k ∈{ 2,3,···,n− 1}.
Proof: We compare the equilibrium proﬁt levels for ﬁrms 1 and k(∈ [2,n−1]), applying the
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k+1 − x − (x − x
E
k ))(A − t(x
E
k+1 − x))dx. (5)
The second terms in (4) and (5) are equal in equilibrium, since the ﬁrms are located equidis-
tantly. Thus, to prove that ﬁrm 1 has a larger proﬁt than ﬁrm 2, we need to show that the
ﬁrst term in (4) is larger than that in (5) in equilibrium.
The integrand in each term is the local proﬁt, with (xE
2 −x) and (x−xE
k−1) the price. The
former in the range [0,x E
1 ] is larger than the latter in the range [(xE
1 + xE
2 )/2,x E
2 ]. Since by
assumption the price is lower than the monopoly level, the integrand in (4) is larger than that
in (5). Now, all we need to show is that the length of the range in (4), that is [0,x E
1 ], is larger











































n(2an2 − 3n +2+n
√
4n2a2 − 12na +8 a +7 )
> 0.
Thus we have the desired result. Q.E.D.
The ﬁrms on the edges make larger proﬁts than the ﬁrms located between them, as the
former ﬁrms face only one neighbor, giving them more market area and less competition.
4. Welfare Implications
We consider welfare implications. We denote consumer surplus at each location by cs(x)=
1





total producer surplus by Π =

i Πi, and total welfare by W = CS +Π .
Consider the ﬁrst best outcome. The social planner controls both prices and locations
of ﬁrms. Then social welfare is maximized by marginal cost pricing of each ﬁrm and the
location pattern that eﬀectively minimizes transport costs. Thus, the ﬁrst best is achieved by
xFB
i =( 2 i − 1)/(2n), i ∈{ 1,...,n}, and dividing the market so that each ﬁrm i only serves
markets [(i − 1)/n,i/n]. Note that half of the ﬁrms located to the left (right) of 1/2 are all
located to the right (left) of the ﬁrst best locations. That is, xE
i > (2i−1)/(2n) if and only if
i<(n +1 ) /2.
We now examine the second-best problem. Given the Bertrand competition in the second




































































and the equalities are satisﬁed if and only if n =3 .
Proof: We here prove case (a). The proof of the other cases can be proceeded similarly and
is available from the authors upon request. In case (a), note that a slight movement by ﬁrm
1 only aﬀects a part of the market area served by ﬁrm 2. Thus we only need to look at those
markets in the following welfare analysis.
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Note that ∂π2(x)/∂p(x)=t(a − 2(x − xE
1 )+|x − xE
2 |) must be positive because the price
p(x)=t(x − xE
1 ) is lower than the monopoly price t(a + |x − xE




























































dx > 0. Q.E.D.
Note that the case for ﬁrm n (n − 1) is the mirror image of case a (c). Proposition 3(a)
implies that a slight increase in the distance between the edge of the linear-city and the outside
ﬁrm from their equilibrium distance increases consumer surplus, reduces the joint proﬁt of the
two ﬁrms, and increases the total social surplus. The direction of the welfare improving
relocation in the second best setting is opposite from the ﬁrst best one. In the second best
case, a decrease in the distance between ﬁrms accelerates competition, particularly near the
edges of the linear city, and thus improves welfare.
Finally, we compare the locations for the three location patterns we analyzed. Table 2
describes the relationship among the ﬁrst best, second best, and equilibrium locations of the
four ﬁrm case for diﬀerent values of a. Let the superscript ‘SB’ and ‘FB’ denote the second
best and the ﬁrst best locations respectively.
From this table we can infer the following. First, similarly to the ﬁrst best case, xSB
1 +xSB
2 =
1/2 holds. Therefore, ﬁrm 1 supplies to markets [0,1/4] and ﬁrm 2 supplies to markets
6Table II: Equilibrium and second best locations for ﬁrms 1 and 2 when n =4 .
a =2 a =3 a =5 a =1 0 a = 100
xE
1 0.1319 0.1294 0.1275 0.1262 0.1251
xSB
1 0.1345 0.1309 0.1284 0.1266 0.1252
xFB
1 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250
xE
2 0.3773 0.3765 0.3758 0.3754 0.3750
xSB
2 0.3655 0.3691 0.3716 0.3734 0.3748
xSB







2 hold. Third, as a increases, all
three values converge. This is because a ≡ A/t going to ∞ implies that the unit transport t
is negligible. This result is consistent with the standard ﬁndings in location theory.
We oﬀer an intuition for these inferences. Consider the 4-ﬁrm case. Both in the ﬁrst best
and the second best cases, welfare is maximized when ineﬃcient transport cost is minimized.
This occurs when ﬁrm 1 supplies to the ﬁrst quarter and ﬁrm 2 supplies to the second quarter
of the market. This is the reason why xSB
1 + xSB
2 =1 /2 holds.
Suppose that the ﬁrms locate so that x1 + x2 =1 /2. Given the ﬁrm’s locations, in the
ﬁrst best pricing case the price p(x) is equal to ﬁrm 1’s marginal cost (unit transport cost) for
x ∈ [0,1/4]. Thus the quantity is decreasing in x for x ∈ [x1,1/4]. On the other hand, in the
second best pricing case (as well as the equilibrium case), the price p(x) is equal to ﬁrm 2’s
marginal cost (unit transport cost) for x ∈ [0,1/4]. Thus the quantity is increasing in x for
x ∈ [x1,1/4].
Consider a change from the ﬁrst best case of x∗
1 =1 /8( x∗
2 =3 /8) to x1 =1 /8+ε
(x2 =3 /8 − ε), where ε is small and positive. It lowers the market prices for all x ∈ [0,1/2]
in the second best pricing case. This competition-accelerating eﬀect does not exist in the ﬁrst
best pricing case. This is one of the factors yielding the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst best and
the second best locations. In addition, the move raises transport costs for markets x ∈ [0,x 1]
and x ∈ [x2,1/2], and it lowers them for markets x ∈ (x1,x 2). In the second best (ﬁrst best)
pricing case, the quantity supplied for markets close to 1/4 is high (low). The cost reducing
eﬀect dominates (is dominated by) the cost rising eﬀect in the second best (ﬁrst best) pricing
case. Note that 1/4 ∈ (x1,x 2). This also yields the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst best and the
second best locations.
In this note we adopt the standard assumption of this ﬁeld in this paper, such as uniform
distribution of consumers. As Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) show, the non-uniform distribution
of consumers can change the equilibrium locations drastically in the mill pricing model. Sim-
ilar principle might apply to the delivered pricing model. Investigating this problem in the
delivered pricing model remains for future research.
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